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Introduction 
The industrialization process in the food industry is increasing at a very rapid 
pace. In the USA, more than 95% of the eggs, almost 100% of the broiler 
production, and 98% of vegetables for processing, is produced under contract or 
direct vertical ownership (Manchester [1]). In the hog industry the portion of 
total production produced under contracts is 5% and another 5% is produced by 
vertically integrated firms. In the grain industry, only a small percentage (less 
than 2%) is produced under such arrangements, whereas the vast majority of 
the production is produced by independent farmers (Manchester [1]). Why is it 
that certain agriculture industries have developed in an industrialized fashion 
faster than others? What are the economic implications of this form of produc­
tion system? 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economic analytics of 
contracting in agriculture, particularly in the intensive livestock industry, in 
order to provide some answers to the above questions, in a purely theoretical 
form. More specifically, in this paper we put forward a game theoretic model 
which attempts to examine the first question given above, and to provide a tool 
and some insights into the analysis of the second question. A dynamic game 
with incomplete information is set up, to model a situation where a feed mill 
contracts with farmers for the production of an output. Initially there are no 
alternatives to the producers but to contract, and later this constraint is relaxed 
and the producers are allowed to produce independently. It can be shown that 
this may result in adverse selection problems. The game is in the family of 
signalling games, the signal here is some type of investment that the producer is 
undertaking in order to "signal" to the contractor whether she is a "good" or a 
"bad" farmer. 
Theory of Organizational Form and Contract Choice 
Contracting in agriculture has been a subject of ongoing research since A. 
Marshall (Marshall [2]; Cheung [3]; Knoeber [4]; Rhodes [5]; Barry [6]). One 
natural approach has been to view contracting as a form of vertical integration 
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and apply standard industrial organization (I-O) theory to model it. The most 
recent extensive treatment of this approach is by Wu [7] and to a lesser extend 
by Roy er [8]. The basic premise of the 1-0 approach is to treat an exclusive 
contract between a downstream and an upstream firm as an alternative to some 
type of competition (open market, Cournot, Bertran, Stackelberg, etc.). In a 
game theoretic framework the outputs of the firms and the welfare implications 
of each alternative can then be determined. Wu shows that total output 
decreases as the number of firms tied with contracts increases and as the 
number of vertically integrated firms decreases (Wu [7], pp. 72-82). 
Within this analysis, it is not surprising that a downstream firm finds 
itself in a worse position when it ties itself to a contract with an upstream input 
supplier than it would have been if it had relied on the open market. The 
reason being, that competition between upstream firms will drive the input price 
down, whereas the firms tied to a contract will not be able to switch to a lower 
price supplier. This result is somewhat awkward, since it does not let one get 
to the heart of the problem, namely "why firms enter into contractual arrange­
ments to begin with ?" In fact, Wus' model provides analytical evidence that 
firms have a disincentive to enter into contracts. This outcome is strengthened 
by further investigation where Wu searches for the possibility of joint profits 
for both upstream and downstream firms combined, and the potential for lamp 
sum transfers between upstream and downstream contracting parties. In no case 
was it found that joint profits increase under contract. One explanation put 
forward is the efficiency argument by the transaction cost school. 
Consideration of transaction costs has made possible the analysis of 
organizational forms. Williamson notes: "... if transaction costs are negligible, 
the organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one 
mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by 
costless contracting." (Williamson [9], p. 233). Indeed, in the absence of 
transaction costs, vertical contracting can replicate the advantages of vertical 
financial ownership (Mahoney [10], p. 560). Several studies have shown that 
in the absence of transaction costs, vertical contracts can perfectly substitute 
vertical financial ownership (Blair and Kaserman [11]; Bolton and Bonano, 
[12]). Coase [13], in his seminal article on "the nature of the firm" in 1937, 
was concerned with the choice "firm versus market" and he concluded that: 
"The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that 
there is a cost of using the price mechanism" (Coase [13]). 
However, contracting is not costless. There are three sources of transac­
tion costs according to Williamson [14]: specificity of assets, bounded rational­
ity, and opportunism. The agency literature has provided an extensive treat­
ment of the transaction cost approach to contracting. In fact Williamson [15] 
finds very few differences between transaction and agency costs. 
One branch of the agency literature is the very extensive principal-agent 
approach (Jensen [16] distinguishes two agency literatures the "positive agency" 
and the "principal-agency"). Here the main theme is the incomplete informa­
tion between principals (contractors) and agents (farmers), as well as the 
potential for "shirking" behaviour by the agent (Grossman and Hart [17]; Ross 
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[18]; Milgrom and Roberts [19]; Holmström [20]; Stiglitz and Weiss [20]). 
Within the principal-agent literature, very important contributions have been 
made in the area of share tenancy (Cheung [3]; Allen and Lueck [21]; Stiglitz 
[22]; Hayami and Otsuka [23]). A relatively recent strand within the principle-
agent doctrine has been the literature on franchise contracts (Lafontain [24]; 
Brickley and Dark [25]). 
As limitations of space does not allow for an extensive treatment of the 
vast literature on contracts in agriculture, it is worth mentioning some attempts 
that have raised the issue and have pointed to important aspects of this subject. 
The "synthetic" approach of Mahoney [10], had a great influence on this 
literature where he combines the pure transactions cost approach with the more 
recent advances in the positive agency theory (Porter [26]; Eisenhardt [27]; 
Ouchi [28]; Ring and Van de Ven [29], among others). Some of the contribu­
tions and significant surveys in the analysis of organization in agriculture have 
been Barkema [30]; Sauvée[31], Barry [6]; Rhodes [5]. The contribution of 
Knoeber [4], and Knoeber and Thurman [32], as well as the work of Laura 
Martin [33], and the on-going research of Grimes and Rhodes [34], [35], are 
some of the most recent comprehensive analytical contributions in the area of 
livestock contracting. 
Most of the research cited above has dealt extensively with the problem 
of contract choice and its peculiarities in agriculture and especially in land 
tenancy as well as in livestock. None of this work has dealt yet with the 
problem of contract failure and especially adverse selection. There have been 
cases in history where the contracting experiment has failed dramatically. One 
such case is cited in Storey and Karantininis [36] in Manitoba, Canada. Also, 
very little can be found in this literature as to why some industries tend to 
integrate more than others. Some attempts can be cited (Raimund Martin and 
Moore [37]; Gillespie, Karantininis, and Storey [38]), however these approaches 
are rather ad-hoc. Knoeber [4] on the other hand, emphasizes the choice of 
tournaments in the broiler versus the turkey industry and not necessarily the 
choice of contracts. 
In this paper, an attempt is made to present a more general analytical 
device that offers an alternative explanation as to why some industries more 
than others tend to rely on contracts rather than on independent production. A 
dynamic game with incomplete information and signals is presented in the 
following Section. 
A Signalling Game with Contracts 
We consider the following game. There are two types of farmers, bad (B) and 
good (G). Their type is determined by "nature". By this, one does not have to 
imagine a purely abstract event, like throwing a dice. "Determined by nature" 
here can be interpreted as simply being exogenous to the model. Furthermore, 
"good" and "bad" does not have any ethical or other such connotation. Good 
and Bad can be interpreted as "full time" and "part time" farmers. Farmers that 
are willing to devote their whole time and effort on livestock farming are 
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expected to show a better performance, whereas others are expected to be poor 
performers in the livestock activity. Everybody in the game knows the initial 
distribution of the farmer types. Let us assume that this is given simply by 
[a,_l-a], where 0<a<l is the percentage of G farmers, and 1-a is the percen­
tage of B farmers. 
The farmers can reveal their type only by giving a "signal". In this case, 
we assume that this signal is some investment that the farmer is willing to 
undertake. The signal could be chosen to be anything else (education, previous 
records, etc.), however, it is common practice in hog or chicken contracting, 
that farmers commit themselves to some type of investment, a new barn, or 
some other buildings and equipment (specific silos, trucks, etc.). This invest­
ment is usually "contract specific". For example, the barn design can be such 
that the boxes will be sized such as to fit the market weight that the contractor 
specifies. Due to asset specificity, the farmers that undertake the investment 
can be expected to remain longer in the contractual relationship, and hence it 
can be inferred that they are of the G type rather than the B type. However, it 
is possible, that the B types could make the investment in order to mislead the 
contractor and be offered a better contract. 
It is assumed that there is one contractor who offers two types of con­
tracts. A High-Protection (H) contract, designed for G farmers; and a Low 
Protection (L) contract, designed for the B types. The contractor makes money 
on both contracts, provided he offers the right contract to the right farmer. A 
lot can be said about contract design, and there exists a vast literature on 
contract theory that discusses the aspects of optimal and incentive contracts 
(Grossman and Hart, Milgrom and Roberts). 
The general rules for the payoffs are as follows: 
a. Farmers: Investment costs farmers 1 unit (payoff of -1 unit), the H 
contract gives a payoff of 3 units and the L contract 1 unit. 
b. Contractor: If he matches the right farmer to the right contract, he 
receives 2 units. He receives an additional unit, if the farmer is G type, 
irrespective of the contract type. 
These payoffs could have be designed to be in a continuum rather than scalars. 
Also, one could design a game where there are more combinations between the 
payoffs. However, by keeping the game as simple as possible, we are able to 
demonstrate some very key features that give us a good insight into the 
problem. 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria 
The extensive form of this game is shown in Figure 1. This game belongs to 
the general game-type known as "signalling games" (Kreps and Wilson [39]; 
Spence [40]; Gibbons [41]). The objective is to find the perfect Bayesian 
equilibria (Kreps and Wilson [39]; Gibbons [41]). The literature cited contains 
enough details about the conditions of Bayesian equilibria. The key feature of 
this equilibrium is that incomplete information is available, and the players in 
this game form beliefs about the strategies the other players follow. These 
beliefs are elevated to the level of the importance of strategies so they are 
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"reasonable" as much as the strategies must be "credible" (Gibbons [41]; Kreps 
and Wilson [39]; Harsanyi [42]). 
Two types of perfect Bayesian equilibria are investigated in the signalling 
games, "pooling" and "separating". Pooling equilibrium is one where both 
types give the same signal and they can not be distinguished in the equilibrium. 
Separating equilibrium is one where the two types are revealed by their signal 
(i.e. in this case, by whether they invest or not). 
Let us first examine the pooling equilibrium [(N,N)], i.e. the case where 
both types of farmers do not invest. Initially we assume that the probability is 
a=0.5. Following Bayes' rule and the farmer's strategy, the contractor assigns 
a probability ß=0.5 (ß=al/[al+(l-a)l]) that she is a G type if she chooses N 
(and hence l-ß_=_0.5, that she is B type if she chooses N). Given this, the 
best response for the contractor is to offer the farmer an H contract which gives 
a payoff of 3 to both types of farmers. However, if the initial farmer type 
probability is a<0.5, then the best response for the contractor is to offer an L 
contract. Intuitively, if there are more bad farmers relative to good farmers, it 
is better for the contractor to offer an L contract, rather than an H contract 
(given the specific payoffs). 
In order for this to be an equilibrium, the farmers must have no incentive 
to deviate. Let us first check the G farmer's incentive to deviate: In order not 
to deviate, his reward if he invests must be less than if he does not invest. If 
the initial probability is a>0.5, then, as we sow above, the contractor always 
offers an H contract which gives a reward of 3 to the G farmer. This strictly 
dominates any alternative (H, or L) if the farmer invests because if he invests 
he gets at best 2. But, what if the initial distribution is a<0.5 and the contrac­
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tor chooses L with a payoff of 1 for the G farmer? In this case, in order for 
these pooling strategies to be in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium we need to 
check whether there is an incentive for the G farmer to deviate. In order for 
the G farmer not to deviate by investing, the contractor must offer L if he 
observes investment, so the payoff for the G farmer is 0, which is less than 
what he gets if he doesn't invest (payoff of 1). In order for the contractor to 
chose L, his belief about probability y, must be y<0.5 (solving the inequality: 
3y+0[l-y]>_ly+2[l-y], gives_y<0.5). For the same reason, the B farmer will 
not deviate either. Therefore, we find that |(N,N),(H,L)J, for (a>0.5), or 
(a<0.5_and y<0.5) is a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
This equilibrium may seem paradoxical: the contractor offers an H 
contract when he observes N and H or L, when he observes I. Let us give an 
intuitive explanation for this seemingly paradoxical equilibrium. First, let us 
take the situation where there are more G producers than B (a>0.5). Then the 
contractor, since his payoff depends on "matching the right farmer to the right 
contract" is offering an H contract because it is more likely that the producer is 
G. If the payoffs were determined differently, then we could probably have 
reached a different equilibrium. Therefore, in this case the equilibrium is 
driven by the initial distribution [a,l-a] of the farmer types and the specific 
determination of the payoffs. 
The second pooling equilibrium is [(1,1), H,L)]. This can be a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, if a>0.5 and ß<0.5. In this case, the contractor's 
strategy is (H,L). None of the farmer types has an incentive to deviate from 
this equilibrium. 
The separating equilibrium [(I,N), (H,L)], is not perfect Bayesian because 
the B type has an incentive to deviate and invest (pretending he is a G farmer 
and being offered an H contract with a payoff 2>1). On the other hand, if the 
contractor follows a strategy [(1,1), (H,H)], it can not result in equilibrium, 
since there is an incentive for type G to deviate and Not invest for a payoff of 
3>2. Similarly, the separating equilibrium (N,I) is not perfect Bayesian. 
Hence, the game in Figure 1 can only produce two pooling equilibria, 
depending on the initial distribution of farmer types and the contractor's 
beliefs: 
1. (i) a>0.5: [(N,N), (L,H)] V 0<y<l 
(ii) a>0.5_A 0<ß<0.5 [(1,1), (H,L)] 
2. a<0.5 A 0<y<0.5 [(N,N), (L,L)] 
The Choice to Remain Independent: Adverse Selection 
In the game presented above, the players were assumed to have no choice but 
to enter into a contract. This, however, does not represent the reality, since a 
producer always has the choice to remain independent. In Figure 2, we present 
a game where we suppose that if a G type producer remains independent he 
receives a payoff of 2 and a B type a payoff of 1, whereas the contractor 
receives 1 in both cases. It is logical to assume that the contractor being a feed 
mill can sell compound feed to the farmers for a standard profit determined by 
the competition. It may seem initially too strong an assumption that the farmer 
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who remains independent will necessarily chose to buy the feed from the 
specific feed mill. This can be justified by two arguments. First, it can be 
viewed as a spatial monopoly, where the existing feed manufacturer charges the 
price of the next alternative feed mill plus transportation cost. Or, alternatively, 
it can be viewed as that the feed mill has to produce to maximum capacity, and 
if he can not find a contractée he sells the feed in the open market for the 
going price, similarly, the farmer can buy feed of the same quality and price on 
the open market. 
3 1 0 2 
Figure 2. Adverse Selection, Contracts and Open Market Transactions 
In this case, the equilibrium 2 described above, fails because the G type 
has an incentive to deviate by being independent. Both equilibria 1-i, and 1-ii 
still hold. Now, we have to examine two alternative separating equilibria where 
one type chooses to be independent and the other to enter into a contract: 
First, the separating equilibrium where the G farmer is independent and 
the B is contracting. There are two possibilities here: [F,N] and [F,I], Take 
the latter first. The contractor places a probability y=0 (based on Bayes' rule 
and the farmer's strategy). The strategy [F,I], however, is equilibrium domi­
nated by N: the B type fanner should always play N, if the contractor places a 
belief y=0, because he (the B type) will always be better off (at least a payoff 
of 1) if he plays N. 
The separating equilibrium [(F,N), (L,L)] is perfectly Bayesian if y<0.5. 
The belief that y<0.5 is actually intuitively satisfied: The observation (I) is off 
the equilibrium path, and the belief should be determined by Bayes' rule and 
the players' equilibrium strategies where possible (Gibbons, 1992). Given that 
the G farmer's strategy is F, then the contractor must place a probability of 
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7=0. This is true for the additional reason that I is dominated by F for farmer 
G. Hence, if the contractor unexpectedly observes (I) he will believe that this 
can only be a B type and he offers B, which gives the contractor a payoff of 2 
(and the farmer a payoff of 0.). As a result, the B farmer will not play I. 
Similarly, the G farmer will not play F either, because any outcome of N (at 
best 3, at worst 1) is at least as good as F (a payoff of 1). Therefore, the 
following separating equilibrium is perfectly Bayesian. 
3. [(F,N), (L,L)] for y=0 
This equilibrium depicts a case where the G farmers prefer to be inde­
pendent, whereas the B farmers chose to Not invest and enter into a B contract. 
This equilibrium leads to an adverse selection situation: The contractor would 
like to attract the Good farmers into the contracting scheme, however only Bad 
farmers are attracted and the Good farmers prefer to be independent. 
There is, however, an intuitively derived situation where this equilibrium 
can never be observed: the contractor can always promise that anybody 
receives an H contract, and under certain conditions this might be believed. 
This promise is "credible" if the initial distribution is a>0.5. This is explained 
as follows: The payoff the contractor receives if the Good farmers are indepen­
dent and the Bad farmers enter into a contract is al+(l-a)2=2-a. If the 
contractor always offers an A contract, then his payoff is: a3+(l-a)0=3a. 
Therefore, he will do the latter (offer an H contract) if: 3a>2-a, or a>0.5. 
Therefore, if the initial distribution is such that Good farmers exceed Bad 
farmers (a>0.5), then the contractor can make the "credible promise" that 
anyone entering into a contract will receive an H type irrespectively, and this 
promise will be believed by both types. In this case, the game becomes a 
"prisoner's dilemma" game. 
The second separating equilibria [I,F], and [N,F] where the Bad farmer 
remains independent and the Good farmer contracts in, does not satisfy the 
conditions of perfect Bayesian equilibria. 
Discussion 
We have shown that in the game as presented above, there is a possibility of 
both pooling and separating equilibria. As the game is constructed it has been 
shown too that the separating equilibrium leads to adverse selection: the 
contracts are designed in such a way that they attract the poor perfomers into 
the contracting scheme, whereas the good producers prefer to remain indepen­
dent. 
What are the conditions that can result in such a situation ? First, as we have 
seen above, if the initial distribution of the farmer types gives more Good 
farmers than Bad ones, the situation may result in a prisoner's dilemma. But, 
what determines the initial distribution of Farmer types ? 
a. As discussed earlier, the distribution is not determined, per se, by human 
nature (i.e. some people are simply more capable than others). In addition, it 
can be determined by the alternatives these producers have. If, for example, 
crop farming is profitable, this will tend to increase the percentage of "Bad 
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farmers" since they will be willing to spend less time and effort on their 
livestock operation than on crops. 
b. The profitability of independent livestock production will also determine 
the distribution as well as the payoffs for independent producers. If the 
profitability of independent production is such that it guarantees a compatible 
payoff, then it is likely that more producers will chose this alternative. The 
profitability of independent production, in turn, depends on various factors: 
structure and competition in the market for final products, structure and 
competition in the market for inputs, and economies of scale. The market 
structure and competition in the final market will determine the margins that 
are available for independent producers. The market structure in the final 
market is partially determined, by the structure and economies of scale in 
processing, marketing and distribution and retail firms in the industry. For 
example, in the chicken industry, where the product is very standardized, final 
distribution is done via super market chains, where there are highly 
oligopolistic structures and the margins are small for producers. Whereas, pork 
and other types of red meat in some countries are still distributed to a large 
extent via independent small and medium sized butchers where competition is 
greater. This can be one of the many reasons why the chicken industry is more 
integrated with more production produced under contracts. 
The structure of the inputs market is also very important. For example, 
in the chicken industry, due to technology, there has been a complete separation 
between hatching and chicken production. Conversely, in the pork and beef 
industry the two processes (piglet and pork production) are still to a great 
degree integrated. This results in a completely different structure: chicks that 
are produced by large scale (rather oligopolistic) hatchers are an input to 
chicken farmers. In pig production, on the other hand, even though there are 
also certain economies of scale in breeding sows to produce piglets, once a 
farm reaches a certain size it always pays to finish the hogs to market, instead 
of simply selling piglets. As a result, piglets are sold mainly by small to 
medium size producers and hence the market is more competitive, given also 
that it is always easier to integrate (farrow-to-finish) - something almost 
impossible for chicken production, unless a very large scale is reached. 
c. The design of contracts. This is a very crucial issue in this analysis. As 
we saw above, the payoffs the producers receive from the various types of 
contracts determine their equilibrium strategies and beliefs. Two aspects are 
very important in contract design: Incentives and monitoring. 
Incentive contracts. Since people have an incentive to shirk, the contract must 
provide enough incentives so that they induce people to make a maximum 
effort. The principal-agent literature provides a good background and alterna­
tive solutions to the problem (Hart and Holmström [43]; Hart [44]; Milgrom 
and Roberts [19]). The analysis presented above points to two important 
elements for the contract designer (a) extraction of the maximum effort on the 
part of the farmer, and (b) a contract that selects "good" from "bad" producers, 
and gives an incentive to good producers to enter into contracting instead of 
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remaining independent. This later part we believe is the elementary contribu­
tion of this analysis in the analysis of contracts in the livestock industry. 
Monitoring. Costs of monitoring is very important in relation to the previous 
discussion on incentive contracts. If monitoring is costly then the contract must 
be designed so as to induce farmers to put in a maximum effort with no need 
of monitoring. Furthermore, where maximum effort can not be extracted, due 
to costly monitoring, a second best outcome may result (Hayami and Otsuka 
[23]; Williamson [14]; Stiglitz [22]) 
d. Attitudes towards risk. Depending on the level of risk of independent 
production versus that under contract, and the risk attitudes of farmers and 
contractors, different equilibria may result. For example, risk averse producers 
will tend to prefer the shelter of contract production as opposed to risk-neutral 
(and risk-loving) producers. Also, if there is enough competition on the final 
markets, it is very hard for the contractor to provide any more risk coverage 
than the market already provides. In this case, the contract can not be more 
attractive than the open market transaction for the producer, from a risk point 
of view. 
In practice, there have been various methods to avoid the problem of 
adverse selection and to design a more appropriate contract. In the chicken 
industry, for example, the use of "tournaments" seems to provide an efficient 
alternative, given its long survival in the US (Knoeber [4] provides an excellent 
treatment, more theoretical work can be found in Lazear [45]). 
Summary and Extensions 
The analysis presented in this paper provides a point of departure for the 
understanding of contracting in the livestock industry, and more generally in 
agriculture. It provides with a structure that may prove useful for the positive 
analysis of the organizational structure of agricultural industries. It points to 
structural characteristics and variables that could be key determinants in the 
understanding of why certain organizational forms emerge in certain industries. 
Some of the factors can be identified as industry-specific, whereas others, 
exogenous to the industry and perhaps more country- specific. 
This model can be extended in many directions. First, it could be 
enriched by specifying a continuum of payoffs instead of the simplified scalar 
representation in this paper. This can be done by specifying production and 
utility functions for the various participants. Furthermore, one could introduce 
some risk elements, which might prove very significant for the analysis. For 
example, the literature provides an extensive discussion on the attitudes towards 
risk of contractors and farmer contractées (Allen and Lueck [21]; Hayami and 
Otsuka [23]). 
A very important element that could be incorporated in this model is the 
situation where the contractor (feed mill) has an incentive to cheat too, say by 
providing lower quality input (feed). This is a of double-bind morally hazard­
ous situation (Cooper and Ross [46]). In our case it could be combined with 
the adverse selection problem already analyzed here. 
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